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The Envelope-Aware Flight Management System is an augmentation to a conventional flight management system
that prevents or recovers from loss of control. Loss of control is defined in this work as an excursion outside the
admissible flight envelope. The Envelope-Aware Flight Management System combines flight safety assessment and
management, envelope estimation, flight planning, system identification, and adaptive control functions. This paper
describes integration of envelope estimation, flight planning, and flight safety assessment and management to identify
situations of high loss-of-control risk, override the nominal crew/flight-management-system just in time to prevent loss
of control, and safely recover the aircraft. The Envelope-Aware Flight Management System is applied to prevent in-
flight loss of control for a Twin Otter experiencing a rudder jam, a failure that can be identified and modeled a priori.
Recovery translates to identifying and maintaining states within the contracted flight envelope, as well as building and
following an emergency landing plan that respects the new envelope.
Nomenclature
d = flight plan deviation state
F1, F2,F3, F4 = MDP state features
fM = mode selector switch
M = mode
nturns = number of complete 360-deg turns
in path segment
O∞ = safe set
R∞ = safe set projection
p, q, r = angular rates, deg ∕s
p = dynamic pitch state
R = path planning turn radius, m
r = MDP dynamic roll
(S, A, T , R) = MDP states, actions, transition
probabilities, and rewards
u, v, w = velocities in the aircraft body frame, m∕s
v = MDP discrete airspeed state
x, y, z = three-dimensional position, m
γ = flight path angle, deg
δe, δa, δr = elevator, aileron, and rudder, deg
δp = power control input, percentage
of maximum power
η = distance between waypoints 3 and 4, m
θ = pitch angles, deg
σ = heading angle, deg
ϕ = roll angle, deg
ψ = yaw angle, deg
I. Introduction
AVIATION is an efficient and safe means of transport. Fly-by-wire technology allows onboard automation tomonitor crew
inputs and the suite of connected subsystems. Flight control com-
puters reliably follow flight plans by precisely guiding, navigating,
and controlling the aircraft to follow trimmed flight states or instru-
ment flight plans. Triply redundant architectures provide statistical
guarantees that safety-critical avionics, power, and mechanical
systems will function reliably. Despite the high levels of reliability
and functionality in modern aircraft, loss of control (LOC) accidents
still occur. For this paper, LOC is defined as a condition in which an
unusual attitude, attitude rate of change, or aerodynamic state violate
normal operating constraints, causing deviation outside the normal
flight envelope [1]. Most LOC accidents result from some combina-
tion of inappropriate pilot inputs, bad weather, and onboard system
failures [1].
Envelope protection systems are available today, preventing
specific constraint violations such as minimum airspeed and maxi-
mum bank angle [2]. Thresholds that trigger envelope protections are
static and thus do not adapt to system or environment changes.
Instead, envelope protection disengages when exceptions occur. For
certification, adopting conservative envelope protection thresholds
facilitates airworthiness compliance. It is simpler to inhibit the
envelope protection system than to design a system that would adapt
to the adverse condition that could be proven safe for all different
scenarios. The crewmust then make complex recovery decisions in a
limited time, high-stress, high-workload environment. The like-
lihood of inappropriate crew inputs increases as stress and workload
increase and situational awareness degrades. Additionally, current
flight envelope protection features do not prevent the crew from
deliberately or unintentionally endangering safety of flight (e.g.,
flying into terrain or a building).
This paper presents the Envelope-Aware Flight Management
System (EA-FMS) as an efficient augmentation to a conventional
flight management system (FMS) to improve response to potential
LOC scenarios by effectively processing critical LOC-related data
and generating recovery solutions. EA-FMS combines flight safety
assessment and management (FSAM) [3–7], envelope estimation
[8,9], adaptive flight planner [10], and system identification [11], as
illustrated in Fig. 1. For LOC scenarios not modeled offline, adaptive
control [12] might also be required. The EA-FMS predicts and
prevents or recovers fromLOC situations, including stall and unusual
attitude, whether induced by environment, crew, onboard failure, or
multiple factors. Resiliency can be achieved in cases that can be
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anticipated andmodeled a priori using an envelope or flight dynamics
model database. Envelope estimation and system identification then
process incoming data to generate a match with a database exception
entry. If online adaptation is required for scenarios that cannot be
accurately anticipated, like airframe icing, then envelope estimation
and model parameter updates allow LOC risk assessment and
handling with respect to new envelope constraints. The EA-FMS
flight planner is inactive during nominal flight, engaged only to assist
with online envelope discovery [13] or to guide the aircraft to a safe
state or a safe emergency landing [14]. Flight safety assessment and
management (FSAM) ensures the appropriate control authority is
selected in time to prevent or recover from LOC.
The primary contribution of this work is formal integration of
the different EA-FMS modules that were separately developed in
previous papers. EA-FMS functions and applications are illustrated
using an actuator-failure LOC scenario, specifically a rudder jam.
This failure causes a nonzero yawing moment and adverse rolling
moment due to the airframe’s inertial and aerodynamic cross coupl-
ing. Jammed rudder failure cases can be accurately characterized
offlinewith compiledmodel data then rapidly accessed online should
this rare but dangerous failure occur.
This paper also contributes a procedure to generate an admissible
transition database based on recoverable sets and applies this data-
base to an adaptive flight planner that in turn generates constraint-
admissible flight trajectories. This procedure can be applied offline,
as in this work, or it could be extended to update flight envelope
constraints online, given unmodeled or continuously degrading per-
formance for situations such as structural damage or icing.
A final contribution of this paper is in the application of EA-FMS
to prevent loss of control situations related to rudder-jam scenarios.
Offline analysis enables database models to be fully validated and
verified for the rudder-jam case before flight and supports real-time
EA-FMS response in flight. Because the specific failure is charac-
terized in advance, system identification is not used and envelope
estimation can be performed offline.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background
on related research. Section III formulates envelope estimation,
Sec. IV presents path planning, and Sec. V describes flight safety
assessment and management (FSAM). Section VI summarizes the
sequence of offline and online computations required to realize
EA-FMS, whereas Sec. VII presents results of the integrated system
applied to the rudder-jam case study. Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. Related Work
Several methods to identify and mitigate LOC risk have been
investigated in previous work. Most have focused on providing cues
to the pilot or crew. The Safety Augmentation System (SafAS) [15] is
an automation aid to prevent entry into hazardous conditions, such as
unfavorable weather. It identifies flight plan deviations and issues
warning messages and haptic feedback on hazard detection. Icing
Contamination Envelope Protection (ICEPro) [16] identifies airplane
performance degradations resulting from ice contamination with
online system identification and provides associated cues to pilots.
Belcastro and Jacobson [1] proposed theAircraft IntegratedResilient
Safety Assurance and Failsafe Enhancement (AIRSAFE) conceptual
architecture for LOC avoidance. AIRSAFE includes online model-
ing, safety assessment, and resilient control in situations with appre-
ciable LOC risk. Hovakimyan and coworkers [17–19] introduced the
Integrated Reconfigurable Control for Vehicle Resilience (iRe-
CoVeR) architecture that combines flight envelope protection, LOC
prediction and prevention, fault detection and isolation, and a robust
adaptive flight controller to recover from LOC scenarios in transport
class aircraft. EA-FMS and iReCoVeR have been developed in
parallel, with EA-FMS placing greater emphasis on control authority
switching logic and iReCoVeR placing greater emphasis on adaptive
control. The design of an aircraft guidance and control algorithm
for actuator failure and structural damage was investigated by
Chowdhary et al. [20].
A. Envelope Estimation
A flight envelope is a set of constraints. If these constraints
are violated, LOC events become more likely [21]. Techniques to
characterize aircraft states that can lead to future constraint adherence
or violation are necessary to detect and resolve LOC events. This
paper uses safe sets to plan constraint-admissible trajectories. A safe
setO∞ is the set of aircraft initial states for which the nominal closed-
loop response does not violate the imposed constraints. The literature
on computing safe sets and closely related forward and backward
reachable sets for constrained aircraft dynamics is extensive; for
example, see [22–29] and references therein. Many of the existing
approaches exploit nonlinear models and require extensive compu-
tations to solve partial differential equations. Consequently, their
onboard use for scenarios in which aircraft models must be identified
online may be infeasible unless significant simplifications are made
and short horizons are assumed [25].
Fig. 1 The envelope-aware flight management system.
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Because the EA-FMS relies on identified linearized models,
information about changes in parameters, such as CD0 and CL0, that
impact the global flight envelope can be inferred from identified
models [11]. These identified parameter changes can be used to
update the flight envelope boundary constraints. Envelope constraint
updates in turn change the state and control constraint representations
used by a controller state and reference governor (CSRG) [9,30,31].
A CSRG resets internal controller states and the reference signal to
improve performance and enforce the imposed state and control
constraints based on the safe sets definition for this closed loop
system: the set of all initial plant states, internal controller states, and
references, such that the ensuing trajectories are constraint admis-
sible. These sets are calculated for each equilibrium or trim condition
based on linear models. They can be sequenced to ensure transitions
between trim conditions are constraint admissible.
B. Adaptive Flight Planner
LOC avoidance and recovery require flight planning and guidance
commands that keep the aircraft within a potentially reduced flight en-
velope space. Adaptive flight planner in EA-FMS may require func-
tionality ranging from generating a single new reference state, as in
climb reduction for stall avoidance, to a fully updated emergency
landing flight plan. For the dangerous rudder-jam scenario, the EA-
FMS flight planner proposes a short-term emergency landing plan
respecting degraded flight envelope constraints. The first task in emer-
gency landing planning is to determine a suitable landing site(s). The
flight planner then rapidly creates feasible paths to the selected site(s).
Airport runways are favored as landing sites. Airport database
and weather information can inform a utility function to prioritize
runways [14] with recent extension to consider off-runway landing
sites if necessary [10]. Related work [32] combines en route and
landing site risk in landing site prioritization at the cost of increased
computational overhead.
Path or trajectory planning has been performed with fast geomet-
ric, as well as search and numerical optimization, methods. Geometric
path planners for fixed-wing aircraft are typically three-dimensional
(3-D) extensions of Dubins’ minimum-length two-dimensional (2-D)
path with a minimum turn radius constraint [33]. The third vertical-
dimension path can be specified independently of the planar motion
with flight path angle limitations [34] or as a direct extension of the
Dubins formulation, as in [35]. Minimum-length geometric solutions
are typically linkedwith airplane kinodynamics constraints using fixed
airspeed and bank angle values with small angles assumptions [36].
A segmented path can be constructed from trim state segments.
Turning and straight segments can be connected using results derived
from geometric planners such as Dubins [14]. Such path planners
respect airplane dynamic constraints in each segment, and state
transitions can also be taken into consideration in complete solutions;
for example, see [37,38] and references therein.
Generalized path planning with dynamic constraints can be per-
formed using optimal control. Initial and final states define a two-
point boundary value problem (BVP). Several methods have been
developed, yet high computational overhead and strong dependence
of solution convergence on boundary points make such solvers
impractical for real-time use [39]. Optimal control performance can
be improved by computing reference trajectories offline and refining
them online as in neighboring optimal control [40]. Optimal control
can also be used to time-parameterize geometric paths [39], and
receding horizon approaches [41] offer short-term solutions that
improve as a function of available computational resources.
Optimality criteria must always be clearly specified. For nominal
flight, balanced minimization of fuel and time is appropriate. For
emergency landing, fuel and time are not as critical as safety, both of
the selected landing site and of the path to that site. Such criteria
therefore require modification to traditional optimality criteria, as
discussed in this work.
C. Flight Safety Assessment and Management
FSAMserves as the activation/deactivation switch for the envelope-
aware FMS. FSAM monitors flight conditions for anomalies and
assesses risks associated with the current flight conditions. If the flight
crew does not respond with appropriate control actions in time to
assure recovery, FSAM overrides with envelope-aware control to
ensure LOC risk ismitigated. FSAM relies on aircraft state and control
input information, quantitative and qualitative metrics obtained from
the envelope estimation, system identification, and flight planning
modules to make override decisions. Techniques that use linear
temporal logic, finite state machines, flow charts, reachable sets, and
Markov decision processes (MDP)/partially observable MDP have
been previously used to construct decision-making logic similar to
FSAM. Chongvisal et al. [18] developed an LOC prediction and
prevention system that used manually defined thresholds to monitor
flight state relative to quantitative LOC envelopes developed by
Wilborn and Foster [21]. An envelope protection control law was
activated if the aircraft violated the thresholds and would then return
the aircraft back into the safe operating regime.However, thiswork did
not consider the effect of changing flight envelopes. Control mode
switching was proposed by Tomlin et al. [42] based on reachable sets
for collision avoidance.Manually engineered flow chartswere used by
Gingras et al. [16] and Srivatsan et al. [43]. The decision variables in
these flow charts were based on aerodynamic and flight performance
look-up tables. These systems only focused onwarning the flight crew
about imminent LOC situations. A decision theoretic approach using
MDPs was proposed by Kochenderfer and Chryssanthacopoulos [44]
in an updated traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS). Both TCAS
andRunwayOverrunProtectionSystem (ROPS) [45] are commercially
available today. Most provide warnings to the crew but do not override
crew authority to ensure timely recovery. The Automatic Ground
Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) developed by the U.S. Air
Force Research Laboratories [46] prevents controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) situations. Using prior maps, a trajectory-prediction routine and
a collision-avoidance routine the Auto-GCAS system overrides the
pilot with a recovery autopilot to prevent imminent CFIT. The Auto-
GCAS system is consistent with the ideals of FSAM.
Previous publications introduced and developed FSAM as a high-
level decision-making module that can address LOC issues related to
aircraft flight dynamics and control, aircraft health, and pilot and
environment characteristics. A general FSAM system formulated as
an MDP was provided in [7,47]. Specialization of FSAM to prevent
LOC events associated with takeoff was presented in [5–7,48].
III. Envelope Estimation and the Controller State and
Reference Governor
This paper models the global flight envelope as a collection of trim
conditions the aircraft can maintain in steady-state. A trim condition
is an equilibrium of the nonlinear aircraft dynamics corresponding to
constant actuator inputs. Flight envelope boundaries are defined by
the minimum and maximum airspeed, angle of attack, sideslip,
attitude, and angular rates (see Appendix A).
The availability of stabilizable trim conditions within the steady-
flight envelope enables the development of control laws based on
linearized aircraft dynamics at these trim conditions. The linear
controllers are only valid in a neighborhood around the corre-
sponding trim conditions. Safe sets are used to characterize constraint-
admissible deviations from the trim condition and to determine if
constraint-admissible transitions between the trim conditions can be
performed.
A. Safe Sets and Safe Trim Transition Sequence Estimation
Aircraft controllers typically use integral action to guarantee
offset-free constant reference command tracking and asymptotic
constant input disturbance rejection. Suppose closed-loop system
dynamics can be locally (near a selected trim condition) represented
by the following linear model,
xk 1  A xk  B rk;
yk  C xk  D rk (1)
in which rk is a reference. The state xk  xT; xTI T is composed
of nonresettable components x, which correspond to the deviations of
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the aircraft states from the trim condition, and of resettable compo-
nents xI , which correspond to the integrator dynamics in the
controller of the form
xIk 1  xIk  CIxk − rk (2)
Thematrix A is assumed to be Schur (i.e., all eigenvalues arewithin
the unit circle), andwe let xe  H r denote the equilibrium state of the
linear model corresponding to a constant reference rk ≡ r. The
nominal reference is denoted by r. If r  0, x converges to the
origin. Control, model validity, and safety constraints lead to local
constraints on the output of Eq. (1) of the form
yk ∈ Y  f y: G y ≤ gg (3)
Constraints from the presented case study are discussed in
Appendix A. To characterize safe states and references, we introduce
the following safe set,
Or∞  f x0; r:  CH  Dr ∈ 1 − ϵ Y
and rk  r ∀ k ≥ 0 ⇒ yk ∈ Y ∀ k ≥ 0g; (4)
in which yk   CI − AkI − A−1 B Dr C Ak x0 and in
which ϵ > 0 is sufficiently small.Or∞ is the set of all initial states x0
and constant reference signals r that lead to responses satisfying the
constraints. If A is Schur ( C, A) is observable, 0 ∈ int Y, and Y is
compact,Or∞ in Eq. (4) is positively invariant, finitely determined (i.
e., represented by a finite number of affine inequalities), convex, and
is a polytope [49]. To guaranteeOr∞ is finitely determined, the set of
admissible constant reference signals is tightened slightly from
 CH  Dr ∈ Y to  CH  Dr ∈ 1 − ϵ Y.
The safe sets can be used in aircraft flight planner to determine a
sequence of trim conditions that can be safely followed by the
aircraft. LetX denote the vector of (nonresettable) aircraft states, and
let Xneq denote the vector of states at the nth trim condition so that
x  X − Xneq. The condition for connectivity and feasibility of a safe
(constraint-admissible) transition from trim condition Xneq to trim
condition Xn1eq can be expressed as
Xneq − Xn1eq ∈ intRn1∞ (5)
in which Rn1∞ denotes the projection of the safe set Or∞  Or;n1∞ ,
corresponding to the linearized closed-loop model at the (n 1)st
trim condition Xn1eq , onto the aircraft states x.
The actual reset of the controller states and adjustment of the
reference is performed by theCSRGdescribed in the next subsection.
With r  0, the CSRG convergence results guarantee rk → 0 and
aircraft states converging asymptotically to the currently commanded
trim condition, Xneq in the sequence. With the connectivity between
different trim conditions established based on Eq. (5), a graph search
can be performed to determine a path between the origin and des-
tination trim conditions. Our approach in this paper is distinguished
(e.g., versus [50] and references therein) by exploiting setsR∞ (which
are projections of safe sets) and by the reset of controller states and
references as necessary to effect constraint-admissible transitions.
Feasibility of transitions between certain trim conditions is a
function of rudder-jamangle in this paper’s case study. Equation (5) is
used to compute connectivity graphs that identify feasible transitions
between trim conditions. Although other implementations are pos-
sible, in this paper, these connectivity graphs are computed offline for
different jam angles and stored in a database that can be accessed in
real time to plan a constraint-admissible flight plan to a safe landing
site. It is straightforward to make the switching sequence robust
against the deviations of the jammed rudder away from discrete
values used in themesh bymodifying the definition ofOr∞ to account
for constant or bounded time-varying disturbances due to the
deviations.
B. Controller State and Reference Governor
The CSRG is used to execute constraint-admissible transitions
between the trim conditions. The CSRG resets xIk and determines
rk based on constrained minimization of the cost function,
J xk; rk  k xk −H rk2P  krk − rk2Γ (6)
in which, for a matrix M, kzk2M  zTMz, Γ  ΓT > 0, and P 
PT > 0 satisfies the Lyapunov equation P  ATP AQL with
QL  QTL > 0. To determine xIk and rk, quadratic programming
problem J xk; rk → minxIk;rk is solved subject to  xk; rk
∈ Or∞, xk  xkT; xIkT T . Note that xk  Xk − Xneq is the
current deviation of the aircraft state from the trim condition Xnkeq ,
which is currently being commanded. CSRG convergence results,
including rk → r and xk → H r, are derived in [30,31]. Feasi-
bility of this optimization problem configured around a given trim
condition implies that a constraint-admissible transition to that trim
condition is feasible by appropriate reset of the controller state and
reference.
IV. Adaptive Flight Planner
Adaptive flight planner (AFP) uses the estimated envelope to
choose a goal waypoint and associated flight plan. For safety-critical
failure cases such as rudder jam, the AFP builds an emergency land-
ing plan by first identifying a suitable landing site and then con-
structing a path to it. The AFP follows the two-step process proposed
in [14]. A landing-site search (LSS) function first identifies and
prioritizes suitable runways, and an extended final Dubins path
planner (EF-DPP) then builds a trim state path to the highest-ranked
suitable runway. Integration with envelope estimation requires trim
condition preprocessing (TCP) offline to translate the envelope
estimate to a tractable trim state set to be used by the trajectory
planner. TCP, LSS, and EF-DPP are described below.
A. Trim Condition Preprocessing (TCP)
For any anomaly or failure that can be characterized a priori, enve-
lope estimation can be performed offline. For a rudder jam, analysis
can occur over a family of jam angles to ensure results are applicable
to any specific case online. The envelope can be converted to a graph
in which nodes are trim conditions and edges connect neighboring
trim conditions that can be accessed without envelope violations.
Because not all trim conditions are mutually reachable, the graph is
not fully-connected. Graph nodes and edges may also vary as a
function of altitude. Recall that optimality for emergency landing is
driven by flight safety rather than metrics such as fuel.
Different schemes can be employed to construct the envelope. This
work defines valid trim conditions for flight planner as those that can
be reached from a wings-level constant altitude or cruise trim state.
This is a compromise between checking all possible transitions
between trim states in the database and only checking the immediate
neighbor trim states. Such sets of valid trim conditions are con-
structed for each pair of altitude and airspeed. In thiswork, airspeed is
held constant, and the intersection of sets of feasible trim conditions
for each altitude is used as an overall feasible set of trim conditions.
Once safe trim conditions and transitions are identified, groups of
four are created and prioritized for the Dubins-based path planner
described below. To downselect from the On4 possible sequences
of the n feasible trim states, airspeed is held constant at its initial trim
value. In future work, sequencing states with progressively lower
airspeeds would assist in minimizing the energy to dissipate after
runway touchdown. Trim states at the borders of the trim state
database and connected trim state space are discarded to provide a
margin for guidance. Trim conditions are ordered as follows for the
Dubins solution described below: The first and third trim condition
must be turning flight with preference for tighter turns and steeper
descent rates. The second trim condition is straight flight, with
preference given to steeper descent rates, whereas the fourth final
approach trim condition must be straight, with a preferred flight path
angle of −3 deg or as close to that value as possible.
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For the rudder-jam scenario TSP can be performed offline, allow-
ing a human operator to verify the reduced trim condition set(s) are
appropriate choices. Note that the selected steeper descent rates
correspond to approximately a 4-deg descent flight path angle that is
well within the feasible envelope; a steep descent shortens the path
extensions required to manage altitude.
B. Landing-Site Search (LSS)
LSS is the process of finding and ranking one or more feasible
landing sites, ideally as a safe runway. The rudder-jam case does not
impose hard constraints on flight time or range. Therefore, instead of
calculating a footprint as in [14], this work simply assumes a fixed
footprint radius in which candidate landing runways are identified.
Runway information is acquired from a Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration database of U.S. airports [51]. The full database was prepro-
cessed to filter for data relevant to LSS, resulting in a small
∼600 kB data file that would be loaded for real-time use on the
airplane. Reachable runways are ordered according to the following
utility-based function, as an extension to [14]:
U
X
i
CiwiC1
rl
rl;max
C2
rw
rw;max
C3qi
C4
d
dmax
C5
wh−wh;min
wh;max−wh;min

C6
wc;max−wc
wc;max−wc;min
C7qSC8qnfC9cATCC10cff (7)
Ten parameters are included in this function: runway length rl
relative to maximum available runway length rl;max, runway width rw
relative to maximum available runway width rw;max, instrument
approach qualityqi, distanced relative tomaximum landing site search
radius dmax, headwind velocity wh, crosswind velocity wc, surface
quality qs, resources for the next flight availabilitymeasure qnf , staffed
air traffic control tower availability qatc, and firefighter protection
availability qff. The last two terms are new to this work. As originally
proposed [14], parameters are normalized so that each factor of the
utility function changes from0 to 1.Note that, for wind terms, a special
normalization is needed. For this utility term, crosswind componentwc
is always considered positive, which requires use of the crosswind
magnitude without consideration of left/right direction. Additionally,
tailwinds must also be included in thewh term. The proposed formula
subtracts the maximum tailwind (or minimum headwind wh;min) over
all reachable runways to ensure this utility term is nonnegative. Details
of qi, qs, qnf , qatc and qff are presented in Appendix B. Note that the
weights Ci can be chosen by pilots or airliners for different failure
conditions according to their preference.
C. Extended Final Dubins Path Planner (EF-DPP)
The baseline AFP formulation [14] generates segmented paths for
selected runways. Those trajectories are Dubins paths, an extension
ofDubins seminal work [33] defining turning-constrainedminimum-
length 2-D paths. In previouswork [14], a range of feasible flight path
angles was defined, with the solution adopting the midpoint to
maximize margins. This assumption allows the 2-D Dubins curve
defining the lateral path to be combined with an altitude profile that
can be adjusted in the plan and during trajectory tracking. When a
finite set of trim conditions is available, altitude adjustment requires
an additional control parameter, such as landing path length.
Given the current airplane position and the location of the goal
state at the location and heading of the chosen runway threshold, the
first step is to create two waypoints. Waypoint 0 is a certain distance
ahead [1.0 nautical miles (NM) for this work] of the current position
at the current heading with altitude hold; waypoint 0 serves as the
initial planner state, providing time between plan generation and
activation. Moreover, flight time up to waypoint 0 can be used by the
flight crew to check the proposed flight plan and goal airport and
make changes if desired. Waypoint 4 is created at a fixed final ap-
proach leg distance from the runway threshold (1.5 NM in this work)
at an altitude corresponding to a 3-deg final approach flight path
angle at runway heading. The path planner must then connect
waypoints 0 and 4. This work uses segmented trajectories composed
of four segments, two straight segments and two turns, generating an
“extended final trajectory” as described in [14]. Segment length is
obtained using a tractable hill-climbing algorithm. If the required
altitude loss is sufficiently large, complete 360-deg turns are included
in the second turn segment as necessary. Figure 2 illustrates the
waypoint numbering, and Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm to
calculate waypoints 1–3, given a set of trim conditions.
InAlgorithm 1, (xi, yi, zi, σi) are the position and heading associated
with waypoint Wi, and S  fRi; γij0 ≤ i ≤ 3g is the set of trim
conditions defined by TSP. Note that each trim state i is translated to a
turn radius Ri and a flight path angle γi. η is the distance between
waypoints 3 and4, andnturns is the number of complete 360-deg turns in
the trajectory. PositionFromADistanceGivenPathAngle calculates a
position relative to an initial position given a distance, heading, and
flight pathangle,whereasDubins is a 2-DDubins solverwhichuses two
different turn radii. This paper only considers turn–straight-turn
solutions that are possible in most cases, including the presented case
study.Alsonote that the precomputed trimstates determine thedirection
of each turn. CalculateAltitudes determines the altitudes for each
waypoint given the path distance between them and the flight path
angles associatedwith the specified trim states. Although this algorithm
restricts the possible trajectories to those composed of two straight and
two turning segments, the solver can run in real time over multiple sets
of trim conditions and runways. This capability also mitigates eventual
problems in case the solver cannot find a solution for a certain runway
with a certain set of trim states. The solver cannot find a solution, for
example, if there is not enough altitude (η becomes negative), Dubins
solution does not exist or iterations exceed a predetermined number.
V. Flight Safety Assessment and Management
The FSAM module of EA-FMS constantly monitors flight
conditions to assess LOC risk. Under high-risk situations, FSAMcan
override the nominal automation to mitigate the LOC risk. FSAM
W1
W2
W4
W0
W3
Fig. 2 Extended final Dubins path planner.
Algorithm 1 Extended Final Dubins Path Planner
Require: (x0, y0, z0, σ0), (x4, y4, z4, σ4), S  fRi; γij0 ≤ i ≤ 3g
Ensure:W  fxi; yi; zi; σij1 ≤ i ≤ 3g
1. η←0,
2. nturns←0
3. repeat
4. x3; y3; z3f; σ3←PositionFromADistanceGivenPathAngle
x4; y4; z4; σ4; γ3; η
5. fxi; yi; σij1 ≤ i ≤ 2g←Dubins x0; y0; σ0; x3; y3; σ3; R0; R2
6. fzij1 ≤ i ≤ 3g←CalculateAltitudes
fxi; yi; σij0 ≤ i ≤ 3g; γ0; γ1; γ2; nturns
7. if z3 − z3f > 2πR2 tan γ2 then
8. nturns  nturns  1
9. go to line 4
10. η←η z3 − z3f
11. until kz3 − z3fk < tolerance
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effectively serves as an “LOC watchdog” that generalizes specific
override modules such as flight envelope protection. Formulating
FSAM over all possible LOC scenarios is challenging. As an initial
simplification step, each flight is first decomposed by phase, includ-
ing takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing. Within
each phase, FSAM can be further decomposed to address LOC sce-
narios associated with off-nominal conditions such as actuator mal-
function, sensor and instrument failures, and their combinations. The
suite of FSAM submodules for each flight phase simultaneously
monitor for the LOC risk(s) they address. FSAM can be implemented
as a deterministic state machine (e.g., Moore machine) with output at
each state prescribing any control authority switching based on
understanding of LOC events and mitigation strategies [6]. A state
machine formulation facilitates verification, validation, and certifica-
tion of the underlying logic. However, manually designing these finite
state machines to address all possible LOC scenarios has substantial
workload and requires a priori specification of all parameters
governing risk assessment and FSAM authority switching.
In this work FSAM is formulated as an MDP (S, A, T , R), in
which S represents a finite state set, A represents a finite action set,
T : S ×A × S → 0; 1 represents state transition probabilities, and
R: S ×A → R represents a reward function that assigns a finite real
value to each state–action pair. Actions an ∈ A for each state sn ∈ S
at each decision epoch are chosen such that they maximize the
expected cumulative discounted reward. A generalMDP formulation
for FSAM was provided in our complementary work [7,47]. The
optimal policy π: S → A prescribes the optimal action to execute at
each state. To select the appropriate control authority for LOC
recovery, the FSAM MDP [7,47] state features describe aircraft
dynamics and control, aircraft health, pilot state, and environment
characteristics. The MDP actions enable FSAM to remain a passive
monitor under low-to-moderate-risk conditions while overriding the
nominal pilot/autopilot system with the envelope-aware controller
under high-risk conditions. The reward function penalizes unsafe
states and unnecessary changes in control authority. For simplicity,
this work assumes that the features related to the pilot and
environment remain constant at nominal low-risk values. In this
work, the MDP state space is compactly described as
s   V; A; Θ; Φ; D; M; S (8)
Here, V ∈ f v1; v2; v3; v4; v5; v6g represents proximity to the
airspeed envelope boundaries with v1  fVjV ≤ Vming, v2fVj0<
V−Vmin≤0.1ΔVg, v3  fVj0.1ΔV < V − Vmin ≤ 0.4ΔVg,
v4fVj0.4ΔV<V−Vmin≤0.9ΔVg, v5fVj0.9ΔV<V−Vmin≤
ΔVg, and v6  fVjV ≥ Vmaxg. Note that V 

u2  v2  w2
p
represents the airspeed. Vmin and Vmax represent minimum and
maximum airspeeds, respectively. ΔVVmax−Vmin. Note that
aircraft stall occurs in v1 and is an unsafe airspeed state. v6 poses high
structural-damage risk due to aerostructural forces and moments.
A ∈ f α1; α2; α3g, αi  fXjAiX ≤ Big represents proximity to the
adverse aerodynamic envelope boundaries introduced by Wilborn
and Foster [21]. α1, α2 and α3 represent partitions of the adverse
aerodynamic envelope. X  αm; βm, in which αm and βm represent
the normalized angle of attack and sideslip angles respectively.Ai and
Bi are constraint matrices chosen appropriately to represent the
envelope boundaries as shown in Fig. 3.
Θ ∈ fθ1; θ2; θ3; θ4; θ5; θ6g, θi  fXjAiX ≤ Big is a compact
representation of aircraft pitch θ, pitch rate q, and elevator control δe.
Specifically, Θ is a discretization of the dynamic pitch control
envelope introduced by Wilborn and Foster [21]. The dynamic pitch
θ 0 is defined as θ q. Θ is defined below and also illustrated in
Fig. 3. Here, X  θ 0; δe. θ1; : : : ; θ6 represent partitions in the
dynamic pitch control envelope (see Fig. 3) and can be expressed as
linear constraints as shown above. As illustrated in [21], θ1 and θ2
represent safe operating envelope regions. Φ ∈ f ϕ1; : : : ; ϕ6g is a
compact representation of aircraft roll ϕ, pitch rate p, and aileron
control δa and canbe defined similar to Θ. Dynamic rollϕ 0 is defined as
ϕ p. Φ is a discretizationof thedynamic roll control envelope in [21].
D ∈ f d1; d2; d3g characterizes deviation from the current flight
plan and is defined based on cross track deviation from the current
flight plan and the current aircraft heading, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Similar to Θ and Φ, D can also be defined by linear inequalities. This
work defines two control modes M ∈ fP;EAg, in whichP represents
the pilot in control mode and EA represents the envelope-aware
control mode. S ∈ fP;EAg denotes the mode select switch that the
pilot could use to manually activate the EA controller or to request
control back from the EA controller.
The compact state representation does not include rudder actuator
health status. Because a family of MDP policies is constructed and
executed in accordance with specific failure condition, the MDP
constructed for this paper’s rudder-jam case study presumes the
rudder has failed and will remain failed throughout policy execution.
The state features discussed above are functions of envelope param-
eters. These parameters can be stored for different anomaly cases a
priori or updated online via envelope estimation. The proposed state-
Fig. 3 State space partitions: adverse aerodynamic envelope (top left); dynamic pitch control (top right), dynamic roll control (bottom left), and flight
plan deviation (bottom right).
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space abstraction is sufficient for the rudder-jam case study considered
in thiswork, aswell as for other risk scenarios that can bemodeledwith
the dynamic envelope structure proposed by Wilborn and Foster [21].
For FSAM, the MDP actions are a ∈ fNOOP;TOGLg as in [7].
NOOP (no operation) is chosen under nominal conditions in which
FSAM monitors for risk and under conditions in which envelope-
aware authority must persist. TOGL (toggle) overrides the current
control authority to either activate envelope-aware control or restore
control to the crew. State transition probabilities can be obtained via
Monte Carlo simulations. An additive reward Rs; a PiwiRi is
defined inwhich theRi penalize unsafe states, as shownbelow and the
wi are weighting parameters.
R1 

−1 if V ∈ f v1; v6g
0 otherwise
R2 

−1 if A ∈ fα3g
0 otherwise
(9)
R3

−1 ifΘ∈fθ3; θ4; θ5; θ6g
0 otherwise
R4

−1 ifΦ∈f ϕ3; ϕ4; ϕ5; ϕ6g
0 otherwise
(10)
R5 

−1 if D ∈ f d3g
0 otherwise
(11)
R6 
8>><
>>:
−1 if M  P ∧ S  P ∧ a  TOGL
−o1 if M  EA ∧ S  P ∧ a  NOOP
−o2 if M  EA ∧ S  EA ∧ a  TOGL
0 otherwise
(12)
Here, 0 ≤ o1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ o2 ≤ 1. Note that R6 discourages
frequent TOGLactions. Persistence in envelope-aware controlmode is
also penalized to encourage transfer of authority to the crew once the
high-risk condition is mitigated. Weighting factors in these reward
formulations are set to w1  100, w2  100, w3  50, w4  50,
w5  50, and w6  10 and to o1  0.5 and o2  1 for the policy
example in Table 1 also used for the rudder-jam study. The compact
state features discussed above lead to a smaller state space. For cases
such as rudder jam that canbe analyzed a priori, optimal policies can be
obtained offline using value iteration [52] and stored as look-up tables.
The total number of states in the look-up table is givenby theproduct of
the size of the individual state features, which yields 7776 states.
Selective content for a sample policy is shown in Table 1. For this
example, when the pilot is in control ( M  P) and airspeed is in the
safe operating region V ∈ f v3; v4g, FSAMchoosesNOOP(lines 3 and
4 in Table 1). When the airspeed decreases ( V  v2) to high-risk
levels, TOGL activates envelope-aware control (line 2). If envelope-
aware control is active ( M  EA) and the airspeed is safe, the example
policy executes TOGL to transfer control back to the pilot (line 15).
This is due to R6 in Eq. (12). Similar behavior is illustrated when
approaching unsafe pitch and roll states.
Table 1 shows a policy excerpt when S  P. Presuming the system
is initializedwith M  P, it will remain inmodeP until either FSAM
executes a TOGL action or the crew manually requests activation of
the envelope-aware controllerwith themode select switch (i.e. setting
S  EA). In this work, whenever S  EA, it is assumed that the crew
desires EA control so that FSAM does not override this decision. For
a rudder-jam scenario, excursions from safe partitions of the adverse
aerodynamic, dynamic pitch control, or dynamic roll control
envelopes can trigger TOGL to envelope-aware control as shown in
Table 1 (lines 5–11). The probability of transitioning back into a
lower risk state in the FSAM MDP is higher with envelope-aware
control, and so this mode persists, although in future work the logic
should be extended to TOGL back to M  P under conditions when
S  P, M  EA, and EA-FMS fails to recover flight within the
stable envelope after sufficient recovery time elapses. Automatic
computation of sufficient recovery time for EA control is beyond the
scope of this paper.
VI. Data Management and Processing
This section describes the offline and online steps required to prepare
and execute EA-FMS for LOC scenarios that can be anticipated and
modeled before in-flight occurrence. Examples of such failure cases are
actuator jams and loss of engine thrust. LOC risk events that require
online identification of the current dynamic model, such as airframe
icing, must be modeled in flight and are considered in complementary
work [53].Analysis of LOC scenarios in advance is advantageouswhen
possible, because offline modeling facilitates the validation and
verification required for flight certification using current procedures.
A. Offline Tasks
Figure 4 shows the offline preprocessing required to prepare EA-
FMS for failure and other exception cases that can be accurately
modeled in advance. First, the engineering team must specify
an aircraft model that captures the failure/exception case under
consideration. Thismodel is used to create a database of possible trim
(equilibrium) conditions that can be achieved for this case, for
example, a rudder jammed at a particular angle.** The trim database is
parametrized by airspeed, climb rate, turn rate, and altitude. Note that
this trim database is one layer down from the top-level EA-FMS case
database; that is, therewill be one trim database per EA-FMS case. For
each trim combination, the database entry contains the corresponding
aircraft state, control surface deflections, and also corresponding
linearized model parameters.
The safe sets at each trim condition are computed as described in
Sec. III.A.With knowledge of the safe sets at each trim condition, a trim
transition or connectivity graph is constructed. Trim conditions are
represented as nodes while directed edges represent feasible transitions
according to Eq. (5). The trim transition graph is then processed as
described in Sec. IV.A to build sets of trimsequences to be used for real-
time path planning. A suite ofMDP policies for nominal and exception
cases are computed offline per Sec. V. Figure 4 shows the process by
which each MDP policy is created and stored. By building the policies
offline, each can be verified manually to ensure that control authority
switching occurs when unsafe states are encountered. If the policy does
not have the desired characteristics, determined manually and/or
through formal verification, the weighting parameters in the MDP
reward formulation [Eqs. (9–12)] are tuned to obtain the desired policy.
This process of verifying the MDP policy can be intractable if the state
space is too large. To facilitate policy verification in large MDPs, the
probability of entering unsafe states can be constrained via the
constrained MDP framework described in [5].
Table 1 Parts ofMDP policy for S  P
Lines M D Φ Θ A V a
1 P d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v1 TOGL
2 P d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v2 TOGL
3 P d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v3 NOOP
4 P d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v4 NOOP
5 P d1 ϕ1 θ1 α2 v3 TOGL
6 P d1 ϕ1 θ1 α2 v4 TOGL
7 P d1 ϕ1 θ2 α1 v3 TOGL
8 P d1 ϕ2 θ1 α1 v3 TOGL
9 P d1 ϕ1 θ2 α2 v3 TOGL
10 P d1 ϕ2 θ1 α2 v3 TOGL
11 P d1 ϕ2 θ2 α1 v3 TOGL
12 P d2 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v3 TOGL
13 EA d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v1 NOOP
14 EA d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v2 NOOP
15 EA d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v3 TOGL
16 EA d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v4 NOOP
17 EA d1 ϕ1 θ1 α1 v5 NOOP
18 EA d1 ϕ1 θ1 α2 v6 NOOP
19 EA d1 ϕ1 θ2 α1 v3 NOOP
20 EA d1 ϕ2 θ1 α1 v3 NOOP
**For control surface jams, each database case might handle an interval of
jam angles so long as a conservative trim database applicable across the
interval is identified.
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B. Online Tasks
Figure 5 shows the EA-FMS execution cycle when both nominal
and exception (anomaly) cases are managed with database infor-
mation generated in offline preprocessing. At the start of a flight, EA-
FMS runs the suite of FSAM, flight planning, and envelope
verification (estimation) models/policies associated with the current
flight phase. When an exception case is identified, it is matched or
indexed to a set of EA databases, providing the appropriate MDP
policy and trim information to EA-FMS. For rudder jam in flight,
FSAM will execute the policy shown in Table 1. In parallel, the EA
flight planner will generate a feasible flight plan for the given
exception, such as an emergency landing plan for rudder jam. Real-
time data is used by all EA-FMS modules, for example, to update
physical state for all modules as well as pilot-specified mode S
for FSAM.
While M  P, FSAM continues to monitor real-time data. If
FSAM detects the need for EA control (TOGL action indicated),
FSAM switches to EA control. If a prepared EA flight plan is ready,
CSRGwill follow it. If no such plan is ready, EA-FMSwill first bring
the aircraft to a feasible trim state. This trim state is used as the initial
state for the EA flight planner (the AFP). As described in Sec. IV.B,
the AFP selects a nearby landing site. It then builds a new flight plan
from the stored trim state sets associated with the given exception
case using the algorithm presented in Sec. IV.C. Note that, for this
example, envelope estimation is not executed online because the
envelope was precomputed offline. Instead, envelope estimation can
run in the background to verify the CSRG controller is able to follow
the flight plan and to potentially update the envelope as needed. Note
that envelope update or online envelope estimation is required for
new cases and for identified cases in which EA control doesn’t
succeed. Envelope estimation would then require support from
system identification and potentially an adaptive control algorithm,
but such cases are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on
control surface (jam) cases.
For cases in which an FSAM policy is not available to mitigate
LOC risk, FSAM will simply remain passive, deferring to the flight
crew. The crew can be alerted that FSAM will not activate EA-FMS
automatically, but the crew would be able to manually engage
envelope-aware control should they elect this option.
VII. Rudder-Jam Case Study Results
A demonstration of the proposed EA-FMS was performed using a
rudder-jam scenario in a Twin Otter aircraft. This work employs
an available nonlinear model of the aircraft [54]. Rudder jam is
simulated by fixing the rudder deflection to 8 deg once the jam
occurs.†† This work makes the following assumptions:
1. Only a rudder jam occurs. There are no secondary anomalies
such as hydraulic line failures, structural damage, etc.
2. Sensors failures do not occur.
3. The rudder jam is correctly diagnosed, and the jam angle is
accurately measured.
4. The postjam aircraft performance model is accurate.
5. No wind is present.
6. The EA-FMS plan can terminate upon final approach.
Touchdown and ground roll-out are not considered in this work.
7. The flight crew will support LOC avoidance with assistance
from FSAM and EA-FMS.
8. A flight plan with a constant approach airspeed is acceptable
without consideration of flaps, slats, gear, etc.
Fig. 5 EA-FMS online execution with exception case databases.
Fig. 4 EA-FMS offline processing for each nominal and exception database case.
††Although a true rudder jam would typically stop the rudder at some
current deflection angle, this work simulates the fault as a ramp input from a
nominal cruise trim state. The difference is that, before the rudder ramp input,
flight is correctly governed by the nominal autopilot, which wouldn’t inject a
large rudder deflection under normal conditions. A large external disturbance,
manual pilot input, sensor glitch, or software error could each cause such an
event, but the LOC simulators used in this paper do not carefully model
disturbances, pilot, sensor health, or software performance.
1034 DI DONATO ETAL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
M
IC
H
IG
A
N
 o
n 
A
pr
il 
5,
 2
01
8 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/1.
G0
002
52 
Future work required to relax these assumptions is discussed
in the end of this section.
A twin-engine airplane subject to an asymmetric rudder-jam offset
can be trimmed in different ways. First, differential thrust can allow
trimming without sideslip. Another option is to use sideslip and
aileron deflection to balance lateral moments. In our model, the high
trim airspeeds do not allow differential thrust alone to trim the
airplanewith zero sideslip. For simplicity, thrust is therefore assumed
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Fig. 6 Trim states and transitions (airspeed  130 KTAS; altitude  8000 ft).
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Fig. 7 Rudder-jam onset and transient response.
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symmetric throughout this paper because sideslip and aileron inputs
can balance rudder-induced moments. An Linear Quadratic-Integral
(LQ-I) control law [55] capable of maintaining a desired bank angle
and flight path is used as the nominal autopilot and corresponds to
M  P. The CSRG described in Sec. III.B and Appendix A, is used
as the envelope-aware safety controller ( M  EA).
Figure 6 shows the trim conditions at 8000 ft for an airspeed of
130 knots true airspeed (KTAS). The axis limits represent the range of
climb and turn rates stored in the database. Each pair of turn-climb
rates is classified in one of six groups.
1. Pairs that do not correspond to a trim condition.
2. Pairs that correspond to a trim condition, but whose closed
loop dynamics require substantial settling time. Settling time can
jeopardize the effectiveness of trim sequence flight planning due to
extended transitions between trim states. Consequently, these states
are not considered for flight planning.
3. Pairs that correspond to trim conditions whose transition to or
from a wings-level constant altitude, or cruise, is not feasible. They
are labeled Unfeasible Transition Trim Conditions.
4. Pairs that correspond to trim conditions whose transitions to and
from a cruise condition using CSRG is feasible without violating any
constraints. These pairs are namedFeasible TransitionTrimConditions.
5. Pairs that correspond to Feasible Transition Trim Conditions
which also maintain a sufficient margin away from unfeasible
transition trim conditions. These pairs are named Safe Feasible
Transition Trim Conditions.
6. Pairs that correspond to Safe Feasible TransitionTrimConditions
ranked first to be used in path planning, as explained in Sec. IV.A.
Figure 6 represents the feasible transition trim points created for a
single altitude. Such trim sets are examined for the initial altitude, a lower
altitude close to the expected landing runways altitudes, and selected
intermediate altitudes. The feasible trim point set list is constrained to
those available at all examined altitudes. Because decreased air density
(increased altitude) usually reduces the number of feasible transition trim
points, trim states for the highest case study altitude are presented.
The case study simulation startswith theTwinOtter cruising at 8000 ft
three miles north-west of San Francisco International Airport (KSFO).
The nominal FMS cruise autopilot is engaged. Figure 7 illustrates the
onset of the rudder jam.The rudder jam is initiated5 s into the simulation.
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Consequently, the sideslip angle starts to increase despite the usage of
ailerons to counteract adverse roll due to the jammed rudder. Because the
sideslip angle violates the inner thresholds of the adverse aerodynamic
envelope (see Fig. 8), FSAM activates envelope-aware control, which
prevents further envelope violations. Note that the simulation assumes
theCSRG (envelope-aware control) is aware of the rudder failure, and so
it uses the appropriate rudder-jamdatabase control law. In this case study,
control is never transferred back to the pilot per the FSAM model
discussed previously, which allows the EA controller to fully execute its
emergency landingplan,givenconcurrence fromthecrewvia the Smode
switch (see Fig. 8b).
When CSRG is initially activated by FSAM, it tries to stabilize the
airplane to a suitable trim conditionwhose safe sets contain the aircraft
state at the point of initiation. This ensures that the envelope constraints
are never violated. The EA flight planner (AFP) builds a list of suitable
runways, ranks them, and constructs a landing plan for the top-ranked
runway. In this case study, theAFP selects KSFO28R ranked first (see
Appendix B). Guidance andCSRG track the given path to the runway.
The top-ranked trim state set chosen by the flight planner is also
presented in Fig. 6. Figure 9 presents the executed flight plan. This
example highlights a tradeoff between using the “preferred” database
trim state sequence and landing at the top-ranked runway. A robust
AFP would explore multiple trim state sequences and multiple
reachable runways to maximize the probability of finding at least one
safe landing plan. If multiple safe landing plans are identified, AFP
would either interact with the crew or internally trade off the top
runway and preferred trim state “desirability.” Maximizing options
requires specification of a nontrivial set of trim state sequences in each
anomaly database entry, in particular, at least a sufficient sequence set
to support both left and right turns for each Dubins turn segment.
Figure 10 shows output from the guidance system after CSRG
engagement. Note that additional trim states are used for accurate
path tracking, motivating the use of a trim state set with appreciable
margin from envelope boundaries as shown in Fig. 6. Figures 11–13
illustrate that the aircraft response with the CSRG satisfies imposed
safety state and control constraints.
Although the example presented above illustrates EA-FMS applica-
tion, it relies on a number of stated assumptions in futurework.Winds of
low intensity can be overcome by the controller or guidance system, but
stronger steady winds must be incorporated into flight planning. Strong
winds can also make final runway alignment challenging. The current
landing site selection module mitigates such hazards by selecting
runways with smaller crosswind components. Ground roll-out may also
be challenging with rudder jam and low power conditions. Differential
wheel braking and aerodynamic surface braking can be used in this case,
but specifics are not addressed in this paper. Sensor failures would also
require additional consideration, although triply redundant architectures
typically handle single failures internally.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper introduced the Envelope-Aware Flight Management
System (EA-FMS) and presented its envelope estimation, adaptive
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(or envelope-aware) flight planning, and flight safety assessment and
management (FSAM) functions. These modules were integrated to
show EA-FMS loss of control (LOC) prevention, given a rudder
actuator jam. A database of feasible trim states, transitions between
these states, and control state reference governors (CSRG) can be
constructed via envelope estimation over the suite of nominal and
anomaly cases that can be modeled offline. This EA-FMS database
can be queried online to provide “trusted” case-appropriate data for
authority management (FSAM), flight planning, and CSRG control.
The rudder-jam case study results illustrated database content and
demonstrated that FSAMwill override just in time to allow EA-FMS
to recover and safely land the disabled aircraft. Use of a “trusted
database” approach to EA-FMS facilitates verification and validation
to assure a safe landing despite high initial LOC risk.
Appendix A: Linearized Aircraft Dynamics and Control
Law Design for Envelope-Aware Control Mode
ATwinOtter aircraft dynamics model is used in this work [54]. This
work uses a power plant model from [54] modified to include altitude
effects. The nonlinear aircraft model is linearized [56] about different
trim conditions. The states for the linearized aircraft dynamics are
Δx  Δα;Δq;ΔU;Δθ;Δβ;Δϕ;Δp;Δr⊺. Here,Δ indicates pertur-
bations from trim conditions. Control inputs are elevator, total engine
power (engines are assumed to give symmetric power), and aileron. The
rudder is jammed and unavailable for control.
Consider a trim condition at an airspeed of U0  130 KTAS,
altitude of h0  8000 ft, flight path angle of γ0  0 deg, bank angle
of ϕ0  0 deg with the rudder jammed at δr0  8 deg. The
corresponding control surface deflections and power required are
δa0  −4.509 deg, δe0  −1.365 deg, δt0  0.666Pmax8000 ft.
Matrices A and B of the continuous time linearized dynamics for
this trim conditions are given in Eqs. (A1) and (A2).
A 
2
66666666664
−1.4716 0.8453 −0.0044 −0.0037 −0.0000 −0.0218 −0.1754 −0.0068
−6.4431 −5.1334 0.0070 0 0 0 0 0
4.2240 −0.3868 −0.0522 −9.6715 −1.7877 1.6191 −0.0883 0.1765
0 0.9892 0 0 0 0 0 −0.1467
−0.0109 0.0010 −0.0005 0.0236 −0.1501 0.1407 0.0306 −0.9701
0 0.0094 0 0 0 0 1.0000 0.0632
0 0 0.0000 0 −2.2723 0 −2.1828 0.2403
0 0 −0.0000 0 1.5372 0 −0.2000 −0.4196
3
77777777775
(A1)
B 
2
66666666664
−0.1590 −0.0011 0
−8.8162 −0.2463 0
−0.3976 1.8652 0
0 0 0
0.0010 −0.0048 0
0 0 0
0 0 −4.4076
0 0 −0.1331
3
77777777775
(A2)
The control scheme is designed with LQ-I techniques. The state
vector is extendedwith integrator states using the followingCImatrix
and a time step for discretization equal to 0.1 s:
CI 
2
4−1 0 0 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
3
5 (A3)
The controller has the form u  −K1Δx − K2xI . The values ofQ
andRmatrices, as well asK1 andK2, for the trim condition presented
above are
Qij 
8<
:
10 xi;lim2−1 if : i  j
0 otherwise
(A4)
Rij  10−3
8<
:
ui;lim2−1 if : i  j
0 otherwise
(A5)
K1
2
4−0.6879 0.9765 0.0098 3.9230 −0.3466 −0.1784 0.0004 −0.2344−0.6834 0.1502 −0.8134 1.9774 3.4742 0.1984 −0.0141 0.8499
−0.1376 −0.0101 0.0021 −0.1940 1.7343 8.3152 2.2127 0.6346
3
5 (A6)
K2 
2
4 1.4892 −0.0001 0.1314−1.2738 −0.4429 0.5001
−0.0221 0.0026 9.6308
3
5 (A7)
The reference command is included using the following matrices:
B 

08;3
−I3x3

D  011;3 Γ  105I3×3 (A8)
The linearized model is constrained with respect to safety, control,
and model validity. Safety constraints keep the aircraft within the
flight envelope. Control constraints reflect ranges in which actuator
positions can physically vary. Model validity constraints ensure the
linearized model is sufficiently accurate and apply to both state
variables and control inputs. The most limiting of the constraints is
used for Q and R matrices. Safety and model validity constraints
(with respect to state variables) are listed in Table A1.
Control and model validity (with respect to control inputs)
constraints are listed in Table A2.
This work assumes the maximum power available at sea level for
each engine is 579 equivalent shaft horsepower.
Appendix B: Landing Site Search Parameters andResults
The LSS runway ranking utility function in Eq. (7) contains a set of
relativeweighting terms. For this paper, weights fC1; C2; : : : ; C10g 
f0.15; 0.15; 0.10; 0.15; 0; 0; 0.10; 0.15; 0.10; 0.10g were chosen.
These rewards balance the terms but would require further input from
the pilot community to be considered “optimal” with respect to user
preferences. Term qi in Eq. (7) rewards the presence of an instrument
approach, with the highest-precision instrument landing system and
microwave landing system approaches receiving value 1.0 and others
(including simplified directional facility, localizer, localizer-type
directional aid, and interim standard microwave landing system)
receiving value 0.5. Hard runway surfaces (concrete or asphalt) are
preferred with surface utility qs  1.0, treated or gravel surfaces
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each receive qs  0.5, and turf or dirt each receive qs  0.25. The
presence of a manned air traffic control tower is also rewarded by
qatc  1.0. Presence of emergency responders qff is rewarded based
on Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 139.315, with indices A
receiving qff  0.5, B receiving qff  0.8, and C, D, or E each
receiving qff  1.0. Available resources for the next flight qnf sum
to an overall maximum total of 1.0; qnf is composed of fuel (value
0.25), airframe maintenance (0.25 for major, 0.125 for minor),
powerplant maintenance (0.25 for major, 0.125 for minor), and
bottled oxygen (0.25 for high and low pressure, 0.125 for high only,
0.125 for low only). Wind terms associated with C5 and C6 are
assigned zero weights in this paper because wind was not modeled.
Table B1 presets the top seven runways selected by LSS in the
case study.
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